For whoever reads the documentation first
How it is built, and what it protects against.
A tool that hands out administrator rights has to be harder to fool than the thing it replaces. This is the design, without the adjectives.
The path of one approval
Four parties. Only one of them is trusted.
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User's session
The agent asks
The tray app, the command line and the UAC helper are ordinary clients. Nothing they say about who they are is believed.
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Runs as SYSTEM
The service decides
It works out who is calling from the connection itself, identifies the file, checks the rules and verifies every signature.
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Your portal
The portal signs
Rules and decisions leave the portal signed. A computer acts on nothing that does not verify against the key it pinned at install.
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Your technician
A person answers
Signed in with two steps, within the clients they have been given, and on the record under their own name.
On the computer
What the agent does, exactly.
Taken from the design documents, not the brochure.
- no passwords
- There is no administrator password to steal. A program runs with the user's own account raised for that program alone, or as a temporary account whose random password no person ever sees.
- signed
- Decisions cannot be forged or replayed. Each approval is signed with Ed25519 and tied to one request, one computer, a single-use nonce and an expiry. It is useless a second time or on another machine.
- same file
- The file that was approved is the file that runs. The service opens the program so that nothing can write to, rename or delete it, hashes it through that handle, and keeps hold until it has started. A file something else still has open for writing is refused.
- temp accounts
- Temporary administrators leave nothing behind. Created for one request, hidden from the sign-in screen, run inside a job object, and removed with their profile when the program exits.
- crash-safe
- A power cut does not leave an admin account lying around. The service writes every change to a journal before making it, and on its next start undoes whatever was left half done.
- no hooks
- Nothing is injected into Windows. The helper that notices a UAC prompt reads it through UI Automation, the same way a screen reader does.
- offline
- Rules arrive signed and stay on the computer. Losing the network does not open anything up.
- key rotation
- The signing key can be replaced without touching a single PC. Agents learn the next key from the current one, inside a signed reply, and from nothing else.
In the portal
The people who can say yes.
Approving admin access is a privilege too, so the portal treats it as one.
- two-step
- Two-step sign-in, and a switch to require it of everyone. A stolen password is not enough to approve anything. Staff can also sign in with a Microsoft work account.
- least access
- Four roles, four levels. Viewer, technician, admin or owner, over the whole MSP, one client, one site or one computer.
- lockout
- Repeated wrong passwords lock the account, and one address trying many accounts is slowed down.
- audit
- Everything is written down. Each request, decision, launch and sign-in, in the portal and on the computers, with who did it.
- our access
- Support access is on the record. If the platform's owner acts as one of your staff to help you, every action is logged under both names.
- notifications
- A notification carries no details. The push only wakes your browser, which then asks the portal what is waiting for the person signed in.
Frameworks and insurers
The control they all ask for.
Removing standing administrator rights appears, in different words, in most security baselines your clients are measured against.
| Where | What it asks for | What PAM gives you |
|---|---|---|
| CIS Controls v8, safeguard 5.4 | Restrict administrator privileges to dedicated administrator accounts | Users work as standard users; admin rights are given to one program at a time |
| ACSC Essential Eight | Restrict administrative privileges | No standing local admin, and a record of every use of admin rights |
| Cyber Essentials (UK) | User access control | Day-to-day accounts without administrator rights, with approval for the exceptions |
| NIST SP 800-53 AC-6 and SP 800-171 3.1.5 | Least privilege | Rights scoped to a program, a user and a length of time, with an audit trail |
| Cyber insurance questionnaires | Commonly ask whether users have local administrator rights | An honest "no", and a report to attach |
PAM is one control. It does not make a client compliant by itself, and your assessor has the final word on what counts as evidence.
Straight talk
What PAM is not.
You will find out in the first week anyway.
- not antivirus
- It decides who may run a program with administrator rights. It does not scan files or watch for malicious behaviour. Keep your EDR.
- not allowlisting
- A program that needs no administrator rights runs as it always did. PAM governs elevation, not every executable.
- not a vault
- It does not store or rotate passwords for servers, network devices or cloud consoles.
- windows only
- Windows 10 (22H2) and Windows 11. There is no agent for macOS or Linux.
Have your first computer connected today.
There is no call to book and no form to wait on. The account you create is the real thing.
Your first 10 computers are free. No card is asked for.
- 01Create your account. Your MSP's name, your name, an email address and a password.
- 02Add a client and a site. Or start with your own office.
- 03Paste one command into your RMM. The computer appears in the portal when it checks in.